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Abstract
Visual decision-making is a common action that recruits a complex set of cognitive processes.
When first presented with an option set from which to choose, participants can rely on one of
two distinct decision strategies, preferential and empirical. In a preferential choice, participants
choose their most preferred option; there is frequently a so-called gaze bias effect in such
choices, where the gaze directed at the chosen option is longer than the gaze at unchosen options.
In empirical choices, participants select an objectively correct choice from a set of distractors;
these decisions have been shown to produce similar or weaker effects of the gaze bias. Although
both forms of decision-making are the subject of scientific investigation, there are no studies that
directly compare and contrast the two types. My project is the first to investigate the two
decision types using a within-participants experimental design. Participants chose between
option pairs in a 2-alternate-forced-choice task with trials grouped into 2 blocks: empirical and
preferential. In the empirical block, option pairs contained one correct and one incorrect choice
whereas in the preferential condition, option pairs were equal in value (i.e., no correct or
incorrect choice). Reaction times for each choice, the number of looks, and duration of gaze for
each option were recorded using a computer and eye tracker. To test whether the gaze bias effect
occurs equally across these two decision types, different decision stimuli (features, math
expressions, and words related to social biases) were used. These experiments thus help to
differentiate between preferential and empirical decision using a novel method. Further, by
introducing social influences in the manipulations, this research also extends our understanding
of social influences on decision-making.
Keywords: Decision-Making, Preference, Gaze Bias, Eye-Movements
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Introduction
We make hundreds of visually guided decisions every day (Wansink & Sobal, 2007).
Although decision-making is a higher order cognitive function that recruits sensory, perception
and action-related areas of the brain (Wang, Wang, Patel, & Patel, 2006), not all decisions are
created equally. We know that our strategies for forming decisions are affected by previously
established decision goals, such as the goal to be correct (accuracy) or the goal to answer as
quickly as possible (speed) (Reddi & Carpenter, 2000). For example, we might decide what shirt
to buy from amongst a few attractive choices or we might decide which of 4 multiple choice
answers is the correct one for our psychology test. The former choice is a preferential one – we
prefer the blue shirt over the white shirt – whereas the latter is an empirical one – we know
answer B is the right one. Intuitively these two choice types feel different and they are
considered different in the research literature.
Visual decision-making consists of gathering information, encoding available options,
assigning values to each option following the decision criterion, hierarchically organizing these
options, and finally assigning and recruiting a motor-response action to the chosen option
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001). This cognitive approach
to decision-making considers it a probabilistic and dynamic process, as opposed to previous
decision-making models that described decisions as deterministic and static (Busemeyer &
Townsend, 1993). Earlier models, such as Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1953) classic Expected
Utility Theory, and others that later expanded on this model (Karni, 2005; Becker, DeGroot &
Marschak, 1963; Fishburn 1973), proposed that decision-making relies on internal preference
formation; however, these models perpetuated the conceptual flaws relating to the main
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assumption of decision as a fixed and binary process independent of deliberation time (Fishburn,
1968).
The above models come from research conducted by economists and describe the
decisions themselves rather than decision formation. This description is partly due to the research
goals of studying decisions in economics, where it is more important to mathematically predict
consumer decisions rather than studying the decision as an active process. This latter objective
evolved when psychologists began to examine how decisions are formed, and posited that
decision makers are actively involved in the formation of choice through visual search (Green &
Swets, 1966) rather than passively accumulating preference towards randomly viewed options.
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) incorporated the assumption of active processing and
proposed that accurate modelling of a decision involves a focus on decision formation and
introduced a cognitive approach that considers the processes of acquiring knowledge and
understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. In this line of thinking, the process of
decision-making involves a selection as well as the thoughts and considerations that precede that
selection. Accordingly, Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) defines choice as
a dynamic process that can be affected by the decision maker’s preference state as well as the
deliberation time. Preference state is the assigned/perceived value of each option and this
changes as a function of deliberation time. Deliberation time is the time between when an option
set is viewed and when a choice is made; decision time is inversely related to the inhibition
strength of a choice response, which is the ability to continue considering your options while
simultaneously refraining from making a choice. Therefore, at the beginning of a choice process
(t0), inhibition strength is highest. As the decision maker encodes the options and their values
and forms a comparison between them, inhibition strength decreases. At the time of choice (t1),
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the decision maker executes the action response related to the choice (such as reaching for the
chosen item or pressing a button corresponding to the item), and inhibition strength has
decreased to zero.
To illustrate these concepts, imagine you are at a restaurant deciding between two menu
options. At the beginning of your decision-making (t0), your inhibition from impulsively
choosing an item is highest, allowing you to identify your options and compare the health
benefits, taste, price and other decision criteria of each option. After some time, your preference
towards one option increases. At the same time, you realise that your waiter is waiting on your
choice, you are hungry and want to eat quickly, and your dinner companion wants to continue
telling you their story. Your inhibition strength has decreased to zero and you are about to
choose the menu item you have been eyeing. Right before you tell your waiter your order, you
quickly realize that you eat at this restaurant all the time and always choose the same thing, so
this time you order the other option(t1). This example highlights how in a real-world setting,
decision-making is not always binary and static. Moreover, the act of decision-making consists
of developing multiple sub-decisions such as how much time we allow ourselves to make
choices and what we value most in each option. Modern theories of decision-making include
consideration of such sub-decisions.
The Involvement of Eye Movement
Although uncertainty is ubiquitous in the processes relating to decision (Shafir &
Tversky, 1992), researchers examine whether common strategies exist in visual decision-making.
As decision makers, we routinely seek information through eye movement, comparing visible
options relative to one another (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Gwizdka & Zhang, 2015). These
eye movements are task dependent (Yarbus, 1967) with specific gaze patterns (Mourant, &

4

Rockwell, 1970; Walker-Smith, Gale & Findlay, 1977) that researchers can capitalize upon by
using multimethod approaches to investigate decision processes.For example, behavioural
responses (i.e., visual information scanning) made prior to decisions provide insight about the
underlying cognitive processes (i.e., sub-decisions) that generate responses (Glaholt & Reingold,
2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013).
The above approach, known as process tracing, involves analyzing participants’
responses and their preceding eye movements or other concurrent behavioural processes
involving attention. To monitor eye movements, an eye-tracker is used and the location and
duration of eye gaze are analyzed by researchers. The eye-tracker records fixations, which are
brief moments of time lasting at least 250 milliseconds when eye gaze is directed towards a
specific location; researchers assume that visual information encoding is most likely to take
place during fixations (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000).
All choices, according to early economics theorists, depend on an internally derived
preference state (Fishburn, 1968). The methods for measuring internal preference state are
divided in two types: stated and revealed (Timmermans, Molin, & Van Noortwijk, 1994;
Adamowicz, Louviere, & Williams, 1994). Stated preference refers to hypothetical situations in
which the subject assigns values to independent choices based on the utility of each item as a set
of defined pros and cons. Revealed preference refers to the subject choosing one item over
another. This analysis assumes that the choices made by participants disclose their hidden
preference (Sen, 1971). In the context of cognitive research on preference, researchers
investigate revealed preference by asking participants to choose one option based on their
personal preference or propensity (Wang & Ruhe, 2007), and all options are virtually equal at the
beginning of any given trial (Sen, 1971).
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In contrast to preferential decision making, an empirical decision-making strategy is
assumed to be perceptually driven with criteria based on previous knowledge and weighted
values of the stimuli (Wang & Ruhe, 2007). For example, a large proportion of memory research
is structured in a way that requires the subject to view a stimulus and then make decisions (i.e.,
did you see this item in a previously viewed list) by completing an action (pressing a key,
selecting an option, etc.); an accuracy score of a participant’s decision-making process is used
for measuring memory (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). Rather than choosing what is most
appealing as in a preferential choice, decision makers guided by empirical strategies follow the
goal of choosing the correct answer. Further, rather than passively ignoring the unchosen option
in preferential choice, data from search tasks indicate that non-targets viewed prior to target
stimuli result in an interference effect (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994). Thus, these empirical
decision processes may differ from preferential choice in that decision makers actively “filter”
options by eliminating the incorrect ones. Such filtering has been argued to be revealed in dwell
time data (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Schotter et al., 2010). Dwell time refers to
the amount of time (usually measured in milliseconds) that eyes are fixated on a specified
location. Proportional dwell time can be calculated as a percentage by dividing the total time
spent dwelling on an option by the total time spent dwelling on an entire visual array or scene. In
this way, options can be comparatively analyzed based on the duration of a participant’s gaze.
Table 1 summarizes the various differences between empirical and preferential decision
strategies. One commonality between classical decision-making methods and contemporary
analysis of decision is that both have previously been used to passively measure post-choice
behavioural data (Response time, Accuracy scores). One contrast is that decision-making
research has reoriented this method towards the collection of cognitive process data that takes

6

place before response-related decisions and during decision formation. In joining these two
methods together, contemporary research (Lohse & Johnson, 1996) during decision-making
(Mackenzie, Glaholt & Reingold, 2011) uses analyzed behavioural responses concurrently with
pre-decision behaviour data to provide a general framework of visual decision-making processes.
By so doing, decision formation can be more accurately investigated in a way that takes into
account the conceptual differences outlined in Table 1.
The elucidation of the differences between these two decision types and a comparative
investigation of their unique mechanisms remain outstanding lacuna in the study of decisionmaking. As noted, preferential choice has no wrong answer, option sets are equal upon
presentation, and the goal is to choose what is most liked (Fischhoff, 2005). Conversely,
empirical choice has a correct answer among incorrect options and the goal is to choose the right
answer (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981). Additionally, the process of elimination, in which
the participant filters unchosen from chosen options, differs among these two types (Onuma,
Penwannakul, Fuchimoto, & Sakai, 2017; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). When
making a choice based on preference, elimination would involve actively looking towards the
preferred option and passively disregarding unappealing options. Following the earlier example
of choosing what to wear, one would be drawn to the aesthetically pleasing sweater while
ignoring other options (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003; Glaholt & Reingold,
2009a). However, during empirical decision in which the decision criterion guides the final
choice, it is expected that each option is scanned and then processed as either correct or incorrect
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). When answering a multiple-choice question, the decision rationale
would more closely follow previous study material and involve more active scanning and
filtering of each option into a hierarchy (A is incorrect, B may be partially correct, C seems the

7

most correct, D is very incorrect). Although these assumptions seem commonsensical, they have
not yet been experimentally tested.
Additionally, because preferential choices have no wrong answer, choices are
comparably inconsistent (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) whereas in empirical choices we
would expect to observe greater consistency because participants are making judgements based
on shared decision goals. This difference may not be revealed by the gaze patterns of these two
decision strategies but may be noteworthy when analyzing the variability of the decision
responses between participants.
Finally, these two decision types vary in their proportion of risk (Kahneman & Tversky,
2013) due in part to the assumption that preference formation involves risk aversion (Kahneman
& Tversky, 2013). Due to the time limitations of this research project, risk was not
experimentally tested. However, it is worth going over a brief description of the nature of risk
because of how universal both risk and uncertainty are in decision research.
Although there are varying definitions of risk depending upon the field of study (Yang &
Qiu, 2005), decision analysts interested in preference and uncertainty define risk as the
subjective and probabilistic perception associated with an individual’s preference or the
possibility of the decision maker choosing an unfavourable outcome (Yang & Qiu, 2005).
Further, risk is thought to depend on two concepts: uncertainty and preference state. Yang and
Qiu (2005) assume that uncertainty and risk are positively correlated, and preference (also
known as expected utility) is negatively correlated with risk. Preference towards a decision is
increased in a preference task, but uncertainty stays the same. This is because this decision type
is subjective, with risks undefined. However, in empirical decisions, as one scans options
looking for the “correct” answer (knowing that there is one), risk has a defined parameter.
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Preference and response are linked during empirical choice since the decision maker has a goal
of selecting a correct answer. Therefore, empirical decisions are perceived as comparatively
riskier than preferential decision-making simply because there exists a chance of being incorrect.
Although there is no single behavioural measure of risk, researchers have attempted to
quantify this concept in a number of ways (Yang & Qiu, 2005; Jia & Dyer, 1996; Fiedler &
Glöckner, 2012). One way is by using pupil dilation as a measure of risk, based upon previous
evidence of a relationship between pupil dilation and noradrenaline (Preuschoff, Marius,
Einhäuser, & Nieuwenhuis, 2011). However, pupil dilation has also been correlated with task
difficulty (Brunyé et al., 2016) and “arousal” during cognitive tasks (Recarte, Pérez, Conchillo,
& Nunes, 2008), making it unclear if pupil dilation measures any one isolated component of
decision-making. Another proposed method of investigating decision under risk is using relative
risk aversion (Dyer & Sarin, 1982). Using this method, participants are assigned risk attitudes
(risk-aversive or risk-taking) based on their decision between choices that offer a guarantee and
those with manipulated probabilities of gaining or losing different reward values (Dyer & Sarin,
1982). In this way, risk is categorically defined by choice rather than scalarly defined by
behaviour (Preuschoff et al., 2011). Following this idea, empirical decision-making (which risks
a correct answer with an incorrect answer) inherently holds an additional dimension of risk over
subjective preferential decision-making.

Table 1
Differences Between Preferential & Empirical Decision Strategies
Decision Type

Preferential

Empirical

Option values at beginning of trial

Equal

Unequal

9
Decision Criterion

Choose most preferred

Choose correct answer

Choice Elimination

Passively ignore disliked

Actively view & mark options as

options

correct/incorrect

Choice Scores

None

1 correct answer

Individual Differences

Based on personal

Based on correct answer

preference
Uncertainty/Risk

Undefined

Defined

A Review of Visual Decision
Gaze Bias
Although both preferential and empirical decision strategies are researched within the
context of visual decision-making, these strategies are used to study independent processes
within largely independent fields. Preferential decision strategies are employed in economics
studies to measure buyer behaviour (Carrigan et al, 2005; Lee, Lerohl & Unterschultz, 2000;
Jarvis, Rungie & Lockshin, 2007; Scarpa et al., 2003), and empirical decision strategies are used
in memory and language studies to measure accuracy or “forgetting” (For example: Koriat &
Goldsmith, 1996; Thomas & Diener, 1990; Watson, Bunting, Poole & Conway, 2005). There are
no known experiments that directly compare the two types of decisions.
To date, research on gaze duration (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Shimojo,
Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003), fixation number (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009b; Glaholt &
Reingold, 2011), response time (Shimojo et al., 2003) and even pupil dilation (Braun, Urai, &
Donner, 2017; de Gee, Knapen, & Donner, 2013; Einhäuser, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2011;
Simpson & Hale, 1969) have been used as behavioural measures of cognitive processing during
visual decision tasks. An additional analysis of decision involves comparing these variables at
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the trial level between chosen and unchosen option (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a; Shimojo et al.,
2003) where a gaze bias effect (GBE) was first revealed during preferential decision-making.
This effect shows a longer time is spent looking at the ultimately chosen option when compared
to unchosen options (Shimojo et al., 2003). This effect has been replicated with 2-Alternate
Forced Choice (2-AFC) tasks of faces (Shimojo et al., 2003), non-face novel stimuli (Schotter,
Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010; Shimojo et al., 2003), and 8-AFCs of scenes/art images
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). In these studies, participants were asked to choose their most
preferred option. In contrast, in studies where participants were asked to choose their most
disliked option, the gaze bias effect was not revealed (Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner,
2010) and longer gaze duration was toward unchosen options. This evidence suggests that
looking behaviour itself, but not selection, may be guided by preference. If selection were guided
by preference, the results would show a gaze bias towards any chosen option regardless of the
task (preference vs. dislike). However, this is not the case, as preferred options were gazed at
longer independent of whether they were chosen or not.
The GBE was first observed by Shimojo and colleagues (2003), where the main goal of
their experiment was to investigate the role of orienting behaviour, or “gazing” on preference
formation. Their reasoning was that if emotions operate along approach/aversion principles, then
these principles would be revealed behaviourally through gaze direction and duration in an
emotion-based preference task. Specifically, Shimojo and his colleagues hypothesized that
orienting behaviour plays an active role in directing passive visual processes (such as direction of
eye movement & foveation) towards the chosen space for attention allocation (Shimojo et al.,
2003). Participants were asked to view pairs of faces and respond by choosing one face using a
keyboard button press. While participants viewed the option pairs, their eye movements were
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recorded until they responded. Upon response, the face pair disappeared, and the next trial would
begin. Five separate tasks were organized such that for each task, 5 participants made decisions
about Face-attractiveness-difficult (FAD), Face-attractiveness-easy (FAE), Face-dislike (FD),
Face-roundness (FR) or Fourier-descriptor-attractiveness (FDA). For the first four tasks (FAD,
FAE, FD, FR), face stimuli were first rated by 12 (different) participants for attractiveness using
a 1-7-point Likert scale. Then, averages for each face were calculated and paired based on their
similarity in attractiveness (for the FAD, FD & FR tasks) or based on their dissimilarity in
attractiveness (FAE task). Faces that were dissimilar were considered to be less difficult due to a
more noticeable contrast between the option pair (FAE), whereas a pair of faces very similar in
attractiveness ratings depict a less-noticeable contrast and would therefore be perceived as more
difficult to choose between (FAD). The instructions for the FAD and FAE tasks were identical,
participants were asked to choose the most attractive face. In the FD task, participants were
instead asked to choose their most disliked face. In the FR task, participants were instructed to
choose the most round looking face. Finally, in the FDA task, pairs of unrated and novel abstract
shapes created by a Fourier-descriptor algorithm were presented to participants who were asked
to choose the more attractive shape. These tasks (FR and FDA) were used to control for selection
bias or memorization of response, by comparing Face-like task results to results that involve
judging non-face stimuli and roundness. For each task, the last 1.67 seconds (i.e., the last 50 data
points from each trial) before response time (RT) were analyzed using Gaze likelihood analyses.
Results were graphed as time until decision (in seconds) by the likelihood that the chosen option
was inspected. Using time until decision and the likelihood of a chosen option being inspected,
all graphs corresponding to the preference tasks began at chance level probability (50%) and
rose to over chance level, regardless of task or stimuli. The FAD task showed the greatest
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increase of probability, up to 83%. In other words, in all like-tasks, participants would begin
trials by looking at the chosen option in equal proportion to the unchosen option, but increased
their gaze towards the eventually chosen option (Shimojo et al., 2003).
Shimojo and colleagues (2003) suggested their findings were due to a positive feedback
loop (gaze cascade hypothesis), consisting of orienting eye movements and increasing
preference. In any given preference choice, participants will probabilistically look at one option,
assign a preference value to that option, look at the other option, assign a preference value to that
option, and continuously increase the gaze duration towards the option with the higher
preference value thereby increasing this preference value (Shimojo et al., 2003). From a
generalized viewpoint of how visual system scanning is modelled, this argument is congruent
with Clark’s (2012; 2015) description of the mind as a “prediction engine” rather than a passive
system that accumulates bottom-up processes. Instead, in this view, the mind stores an internal
expectation of incoming sensory information and compares its model with actual feedback.
When this comparison is incorrect, a non-zero value, called a prediction error is encoded. This
mechanism is comprised of bidirectional crosstalk between deep and superficial neural cells
(Clark, 2012, 2015). Two real examples of the visual system are used as evidence of neural
activity functioning as error predictors. The first example of biphasic neurons within the lateral
geniculate nucleus, V1, and the middle temporal area that respond to opposing stimulus patterns
rather than one stimulus type, highlights the concept of bidirectional crosstalk (Jehee & Ballard,
2009). Secondly, surround suppression activity of neurons takes place when the relative rate of
neuronal firing increases when the orientation of the stimulus is orthogonal to a surrounding
stimulus and decreases when the central stimulus is parallel to the surroundings (Rao &
Sejnowski, 2002). Both instances are accounted for in the generative model of predictive
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processing since neural activity increases in response to incongruent features (Friston & Kiebel,
2009). These findings are also congruent with Shimojo and colleagues’ findings of FAD task
showing longer GBE than FAE. Recall that the difference between face pairs is greater in the
easy condition than in the difficult condition, which may account for increased neural activity in
the easy condition, resulting in less need for a positive feedback loop (Shimojo et al., 2003).
Further, the FAD condition revealed longer mean RT (3.55s+/- 0.18) than the FAE condition
(3.05s+/- 0.12) (Shimojo et al., 2003), suggesting that more time is needed to build an internal
preference towards the chosen option when central stimuli are comparatively similar than when
contrasting pairs are viewed and judged.
One limitation of Shimojo & colleagues’ gaze bias experiment (2003) is that it measures
the GBE in a probabilistic way and therefore dwell duration (the length of time an item is looked
at) and dwell count (the number of times an item is looked at) are collapsed into one variable.
However, these two variables may mean different things and it has been theorized that decisionmaking involves two inter-dependent processes (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Onuma et al., 2017;
Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Schotter et al., 2010). One process is option set encoding
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). This early encoding involves bottom-up processing, in which a
subject receives incoming information that is stored in the working memory during the decision
process. After early encoding, the second process activates, which is the evaluation of the
options (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011), through the top-down processing that is required for a final
decision. Top-down processing uses the information gathered from early encoding to form a
judgement of which option will be selected based on the decision criterion. After this judgement
is assigned, the decision maker will then assign and initiate a motor action that corresponds to
the chosen option. This is important because decision-making is regarded as a probabilistic
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process of information search, but researchers can attempt to analyze both encoding and
evaluative processes individually. For example, Glaholt and Reingold (2011) additionally
suggested that dwell duration reflects the primary selective encoding process of decisionmaking, whereas dwell count reflects the process of comparing options.
To expand on the concept of the GBE and implement a novel method of process tracing,
Glaholt and Reingold (2009a, 2009b, 2011) tested the gaze cascade effect proposed by Shimojo
et al. (2003). They argued that prior models of decision research, which focused on predicting
decision based on responses, lacked the necessary measures for identifying the different stages of
decision-making; the introduction of eye-tracking measures would bridge the gap between
generalized decision research and specific stages of cognitive processing.
The above speculation came from multiple studies that measured both dwell duration and
number of dwells in 8-AFC decision-making tasks with both preference and non-preference
instructions (Glaholt & Reingold, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Glaholt and Reingold (2009a, 2009b,
2011) replicated the GBE in all of their studies, but their analyses of both gaze duration and
dwell count conflicted with the gaze cascade (GC) hypothesis. The GC hypothesis proposes an
explanation for the GBE by asserting that eye movement operates on a positive feedback loop of
increasing towards the favored option while simultaneously favoring the option being examined.
More specifically, the positive feedback loop consists of two effects: mere exposure effect and
familiarity effect. Glaholt and Reingold (2009b) reasoned that if the GBE primarily operated
along these effects, then a manipulation in the exposure of certain options would produce a
longer gaze bias towards those options. When certain options were pre-exposed, the gaze bias of
chosen options was smaller than those of unchosen options (Glaholt and Reingold, 2009b, 2011).
As well, the bias in dwell frequency was unaffected by the exposure manipulation. The pattern of
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gaze bias in both the preference and non-preference instruction conditions were also found to be
extremely similar.
Glaholt and Reingold’s (2009a, 2009b, 2011) work on gaze bias introduced several
noteworthy considerations. Firstly, the GBE can be analyzed in a number of ways: the duration
of dwells, the number of dwells, and even the average dwell duration of chosen/unchosen items
all contribute to the overall gaze bias effect. Secondly, the GBE is present in both preferential
and non-preferential decision tasks (Mitsuda & Glaholt, 2014), and is independent of the
exposure effect. These findings directly contradict Shimojo and colleagues’ gaze cascade
hypothesis which assumes that GB operates along an emotion-contingent, approach/avoidance
mechanism. Since the GBE is replicated outside of preference tasks, cognitive researchers have a
basis for using this effect and its constituents (dwell duration, frequency, average) to measure
and analyze the cognitive components of decision formation.
To elucidate the differences between decision types, it is necessary to understand the
current framework of the general decision-making process. Making a decision of a 2-option pair
begins with viewing one option out of a set and encoding it into working memory and then doing
the same with the second option. Once both pairs are encoded, a perceptual comparison of the
pair is made and one option is selected. To choose one option out of a group involves assigning it
to a corresponding action. For example, in a perceptual decision-making task where one option is
on the right side of the trial window and the other is on the left side, participants will press a
button on a keyboard corresponding to each option. For an empirical decision, the process of
comparison involves assigning one option that corresponds to the decision criterion. In contrast,
when participants are asked to make a choice based on preference (or when option pairs are
equal in value), one can expect that the comparison process involves scanning options multiple
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times until the preference of one option reaches a decision threshold; then a decision-related
action is assigned and carried out. This expectation is congruent with Shimojo and colleagues’
(2003) hypothesis of the gaze cascade effect, where a positive feedback loop initiates an increase
in gaze duration towards the chosen option.
It is unknown whether this effect extends to empirical decision-making. Although no
known experiment has investigated the effects of accuracy based perceptual decision on gaze
bias using the same stimulus set, one recent experiment (Onuma et al., 2017) coupled a
preference task with other perceptual decision-making tasks. Researchers asked participants to
judge between faces and images based on preference, roundness and brightness in separate
blocks and analyzed the effect of first and second looks on each item and subsequent gaze bias.
The researchers hypothesized that the second look would have a longer gaze duration than the
first because it would consist of encoding and comparison of option pairs whereas the first look
would only consist of information encoding. They did indeed observe that the second look
contributed more to the gaze bias than the first look; this effect was longer in the preference
block than the perceptual decision block (roundness). Results were analyzed in this way to
determine if the GBE was merely due to the probability of which item was looked at first. These
observations suggested that information encoding of both options contributed to gaze bias rather
than the item viewed first as being favoured and looked at longer. Although the GBE was
revealed in both tasks, these tasks were only distinguished by asking the participant to make
judgements based on them and not by altering stimulus roundness/brightness in a way that could
lead to empirical choices or be measured as accuracy scores. Therefore, the similar results may
be due to similar decision-making strategies.
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Another experiment by Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, and Rayner (2010) coupled
like/dislike tasks with an accuracy based perceptual decision task. Participants were asked to
either rate pairs of photographs (of scenes, portraits, landscapes and animals) as more liked,
disliked, older or newer. In the older/newer task, participants viewed two photographs, either
both were in colour, black- and-white, or one coloured and one black-and-white. Results
revealed a GBE in the Like task but not in the Dislike task. Even more interesting was the
observation of a GBE, though not as strongly as in the like task, in the Older/Newer tasks. These
results provide additional evidence that the GBE is a salient effect of decision-making, which
may be reinforced by liking effects, but is also a baseline behaviour of the selective encoding and
evaluation processes. Although the Older/Newer task provides a better method for testing
perceptual decision, the difference in colour may be a confound that affects eye gaze. Therefore,
a more robust method of testing GBE on perceptual decision would involve stimulus sets that do
not differ visually (by brightness or colour), and instead differ by the information they encode.
The present experiments serve to bridge this gap by manipulating the perceptual decision
task by presenting unequal option sets. This would more closely match the accuracy-based task
style used in memory studies and would prevent participants from passively forming a
preferential decision strategy. This would also potentially provide a more accurate observation of
an empirical decision strategy including accuracy scores as a variable. Onuma et al. (2017)
counterbalanced the preference and perceptual choice blocks, which may have led to preference
decision strategies to carry through to perceptual decision when presented in that order.
Additionally, the researchers informed participants of when to choose based on preference and
when to choose based on brightness/roundness. Therefore, the effects revealed may have been
due to task instruction and not necessarily reflect how decision strategies are altered outside of
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an experimental context. To further prevent preferential decision strategy carry-over effects and
increase potential external validity, the empirical block will be presented prior to the preference
block in order to switch participants from an accuracy-based decision strategy to a preferencebased strategy without the use of added instruction.
Reaction Time
As previously mentioned, Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) maintain that the
deliberation time provides further insight to the process of decision formation. Decision is
established as a dynamic, stochastic process which innately involves assigning a time limit to
decision, in which a pattern can be revealed from the time at which a subject visually scans an
option set until the time of decision response (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). As well, in the field of
cognitive research, reaction time (RT) is used as a variable for measuring processing speed, or
the rate at which information is encoded. When considering decision formation as a process of
information encoding as well as option comparison, reaction time offers a measure for the time
course allotted to each response. Standardizing reaction time as a variable for measuring
decision-making is not only valuable to the entire field of decision-making from a cognitive
approach, but to this specific research project. Following Shimojo and colleagues’ 2003
experiment, face pairs that were highly similar in preference ratings revealed RTs that were on
average 460ms longer than face pairs that were dissimilar in preference ratings. This is congruent
with prior findings that response time increases as a function of decreasing discriminability
(Verghese, 2001; Palmer & Wright, 1998; Palmer & Mclean, 1995). Thus, the use of reaction
time as a metric of decision formation provides insight into the time course of the detection and
application of discriminating features between an option set.
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To further and more reliably establish characteristic similarities and differences between
these decision-making types, reaction time will act as a secondary variable of interest, as it is
unknown how these decision strategies differ with respect to reaction time. Reaction time
measures the time it takes for a subject to detect, process, and respond to a stimulus. Due to
differing methods and stimulus sets used in independent studies, it is unknown how reaction time
differs by decision type if one were to use an identical stimulus set in the same experiment with
the same subject. This difference in reaction time may also coincide with the gaze bias effect and
further provide descriptive data for each decision type. If gaze bias is related to the selective
encoding process argued by Schotter and colleagues in 2010, then one would expect the reaction
times of the empirical block, where subject responses depend on finding an inequality between
option pairs, to be shorter than the preferential block, where participants encode option pairs as
being equal and therefore cannot selectively encode a correct response and assign a
corresponding button press.
The primary research goal of this thesis is to characterize the behavioural similarities and
differences of preferential and empirical decision-making strategies. Specifically, what are the
behavioural differences between each decision strategy? To what extent is the gaze bias revealed
in each decision strategy? And what is the difference in proportion of mental effort or attention
allocation between these two strategies? Investigating each question involves a different variable
that has to do with a different aspect of decision-making. Reaction time has to do with the speed
at which selective encoding occurs and gaze bias relates to the specific choice. Therefore,
analyzing these two variables provides an integrative approach to analyzing decision strategies as
behaviourally distinct categories when task, stimulus set, and subject remain constant.
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The findings of this research would potentially inform design considerations in media
presentation, marketing, advertising, policymaking, and survey-creation considering that eye
movements play an important role in decision-making. Knowledge of different decision
strategies may provide insight for presentation development to appropriately frame information
designed for consumption (presented facts or statements) and information seeking interactions
(presented questions or options).
Methods
Participants
Forty undergraduate participants aged 17 years or older with normal or corrected-tonormal vision were recruited through the University of Windsor Participant Pool for each
experiment (120 participants total). Participants signed a consent form indicating the nature of
the task prior to the experiment and received partial course credit as compensation. Table 2
summarizes reported demographics of participant age and gender by the University of Windsor
Participant Pool pre-screening questionnaire database as percentages.
Table 2.
Average gender and age demographics of participants that completed one of three studies.
Demographic Categories
Gender
Female
Male
Non-Binary
Total
Age Range
17-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
46-50
51+

Percentage (%)
85
17
1
103
56
29
8
6
2
1
1
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Total

103

Apparatus
Eye movements were tracked and recorded via an SR Eyelink 1000 Plus eye-tracker.
Trials were presented via a 30 x 37.6 cm Dell computer monitor screen with a display resolution
of 1024 x 768 pixels. Participant responses were reported with the left and right “Alt” keys on a
computer keyboard. Eye movement recordings were measured from the participant’s right eye,
the distance of the eye to the top and bottom of the viewable portion of the screen were 720mm
and 765mm, respectively. The experiment was run using ExperimentBuilder software and data
was accessed with Eyelink Data Viewer and Excel.

Stimuli and Design
Three studies, each consisting of a 2-Alternate Forced Choice (2-AFC) task with different
stimulus sets were conducted. Each experiment consisted of two blocks: the empirical block
(options differed in value by either one or two features) and the preferential block (options were
equal or neutral). In each block, trials were randomized. For Experiment 1, all stimuli were handdrawn using a Wacom drawing tablet and GIMP 2 software. The stimulus set consisted of 66
trials (45 empirical and 21 preferential) (See Appendix A for trial examples). Experiment 2 had
60 trials of simple math expressions (30 empirical and 30 preferential) (See Appendix B for trial
example). Experiment 3 had 48 trials consisting of pairs of words derived from a latent semantic
analysis of gender stereotyped words in American English (Lenton, Sedikides, & Bruder, 2009)
(See Appendix C). Word pairs were either traits or roles and were paired as male-female (ex.
Mechanic-Nurse) or neutral-neutral (ex. Attendant-Cashier). The first block consisted of 24 trials
of male-female pairs (12 roles, 12 traits) and the second block consisted of 24 trials of neutral-
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neutral pairs of traits and roles. Words were positioned on the left and right sides of the computer
screen. 40 participants completed 3 practice trials before moving onto each experiment’s test
trials. Before every trial, participants were directed to stare at a centered fixation point to control
for pre-trial gaze position.

Feature Inequality Task
In Experiment 1, three pairs of features (i.e. Shape-circle vs. triangle, Colour-red vs.
green, Line Orientation-horizontal vs. vertical) were presented visually as inequality rules before
the experiment begins. Participants were also able to view the rules prior to each trial (See
Appendix A- Trial Rules and Option Stimulus). Trial stimuli were composed of two image pairs,
each being a combination of two features shown in the inequality rules. To control for position
preference, the pairs were counterbalanced into two lists which alternate equally between
participants. Participants were prompted on-screen to either view the rules by pressing the
Spacebar key or to continue to the next trial by pressing any “Alt” key (see Appendix A).

Math Inequality Task
In Experiment 2, trial stimuli were composed of a pair of simple addition expressions (ex.
1+4 vs. 3+3; 1+3 vs. 2+0). The empirical block had 30 trials in which an option pair had one
summed expression as higher in value than another, by either 1 or 2 units. The preferential block
had 30 trials in which the option pairs, when summed, equaled the same value (see Appendix B).
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Trait/Role Stereotype Task
In Experiment 3, a sentence prime preceded each trial for 5 seconds (See Appendix C). Each
sentence stem was gendered, either as “He/She…” or “The man/woman…” and described a trait
(ex. “…was being…” gendered trial: dominant [masculine] vs. affectionate [feminine], neutral
trial: conscientious vs ridiculous) or (ex. “…worked as a…” gendered trial: machinist
[masculine] vs. florist [feminine], neutral trial: mentor vs. assistant) role . The next screen
presented a word pair. Participants were asked to complete the sentence stem by choosing one of
the two words in the pair.

Procedure
After the researcher described the nature of the task and informed consent was provided
by the participant, the participant was seated at a Windows XP computer running both
ExperimentBuilder software and an EyeLink SR 1000 eye-tracker. The participant had their right
eye calibrated with the eye-tracker. Calibration involved a 9-point on-screen calibration phase in
which the participant focused their gaze on fixation points on screen in 9 locations. After
calibration, participants viewed the task instructions on-screen on a computer. Participants were
read the instructions by the researcher. A fixation point was presented in the middle of the
screen, and participants were instructed to fixate eye movement onto the fixation point. This was
done to ensure all participants began trials with their eyes fixated in the same central, neutral
area prior to data collection. This method also corrected for small drifts in the calculation of gaze
position for subsequent data analysis. Following drift correction, participants were presented
with a pair of stimuli corresponding to the task on-screen and were asked to choose one of the
two options as the correct answer based on each experiment’s instructions by pressing the
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corresponding “Alt” key. If the left image was chosen, participants were instructed to press the
left “Alt” key and if the right image was chosen, participants were instructed to press the right
“Alt” key. Prior to beginning each experiment, participants completed a practice session
involving trials from both blocks to ensure their comprehension of the task instructions.

Data Analysis
Participant data was first opened using the EyeLink DataViewer software. Interest area
reports were obtained in excel file format. Practice trials were omitted from the reports and only
test trials were used for data analysis. Trials which had participants look at only one option or
neither option were omitted from the dataset for analysis.
For each empirical block of each experiment, results were further subdivided into
correct/incorrect responses and an average accuracy score was obtained for empirical blocks of
Experiments 1 and 2. This was done to ensure participants understood task instructions and to
control for guessing. Only correct trials were analyzed for the remaining analyses of proportional
dwell time, reaction time and number of fixations.
For gaze bias analysis, choice responses were re-coded to reflect which option within a
trial was chosen (and which was unchosen). The proportion of time spent looking at each option
was compared between the dwell times (in milliseconds) of chosen options and the dwell times
of unchosen options (in milliseconds). Proportional dwell time was calculated as a percentage by
dividing the total dwell time by each option dwell time (chosen/unchosen). These values were
analyzed using a 2X2 repeated-measures ANOVA for dwell time and number of fixations and a
Paired Sample T-Test for reaction time in each experiment. Experiments 1 and 2 were compared
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using a 2X2X2 repeated-measures ANOVA with block (2 factors: empirical, preferential) and
choice (2 factors: chosen, unchosen) for each dependent variable.

Results & Discussion
Data Cleanup
Trials in which the participant had not looked at one or both option values were excluded
from all three experimental datasets. Experiment 1 included 2640 trials in the raw dataset. 376
trials (14.2%) contained zero values for either one or both of the option dwell time data and were
omitted. Of the remaining 2,264 trials, 742 were preferential trials and 1,522 were empirical
trials1. Experiment 2 included 2,400 trials in the raw dataset. 122 trials (5.1%) contained zero
values for either one or both of the option dwell time data and were omitted. Of the remaining
2,278 trials, 1,112 were preferential trials and 1,165 were empirical trials. Experiment 3 included
1,920 trials in the raw dataset. 195 trials (10.2%) contained zero values for either one or both of
the option dwell time data and were omitted. Of the remaining 1,725 trials, 875 were gender
biased trials and 850 were gender neutral trials. One participant’s data contained zero values for
all trials and was therefore omitted from Experiment 3’s analysis.

Accuracy Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2
To ensure participants understood the instructions of Experiments 1 and 2, accuracy of
the empirical blocks was examined and compared between studies. Participants responded
correctly in 1,352 trials (88.9%) in Experiment 1 and in 1,143 trials (98.2%) in Experiment 2. A

1

This imbalance in trials between blocks reflects the unequal number of cases in the experimental conditions
rather than a disparity in difficulty. In other words, the possible combinations of paired options in the empirical
block outnumbered the possible combinations of pairs in the preferential block.
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comparison between scores was conducted by a repeated-measures ANOVA. A main effect of
accuracy was obtained, F(1,39) = 27.945, p = < .001, ƞ2 = 0.417. Pairwise comparisons indicate
that Experiment 2 resulted in greater accuracy scores (M = 0.981, SE = 0.003) than Experiment 1
(M = 0.882, SE = 0.017).
Comparatively, Experiment 1 appears to be more difficult than Experiment 2, as accuracy scores
between each experiment varied by 10%. This difference in difficulty may have been due to the
more complex nature of the task in Experiment 1. Participants had to keep the relative values of
each rule in their working memory as they applied them to each option, extending their working
memory to maintain the values of each option for their consequent decision response. In contrast,
Experiment 2 involved computing visible numeric values and simply comparing their sums, a
fairly simple task which does not recruit working memory for information beyond the presented
screen of option pairs.

1
0.98
0.96

Accuracy Score

0.94
0.92
0.9

Average of Exp1 Acc
Average of Exp2 Acc

0.88
0.86
0.84
0.82
0.8

Figure 1. Accuracy of studies 1 and 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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These results indicate that participants understood the task instructions and were
not responding by guessing between options because both conditions exceeded the 50% chance
level.

Experiment 1
Dwell Time Analysis
To investigate possible gaze bias between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted in which proportional dwell time (as a percentage) was the dependent variable. A
main effect of block was obtained F(1,39) = 5.413, p = .025, ƞ2 = 0.022. The preferential block
(M = 0.421, S.E. = 0.005) resulted in longer dwell time than the empirical block (M = 0.410, S.E.
= 0.005). There was no main effect of choice.
0.44

Proportion of Dwell Time

0.43
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 mean proportional dwell time of options grouped by block and choice.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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RT Analysis
A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted revealing that the dataset was not normally
distributed in either empirical, W(40) = 0.899, p = 0.002, nor preferential, W(40) = 0.783, p <
0.001, trials. Empirical trials had a skewness of 1.13 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of 0.84 (S.E. =
0.73). Preferential trials had a skewness of 2.02 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of 4.33 (S.E. = 0.73).
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted Z = 104.00, p < .001, which indicated that the RT
was longer in the preferential block (M = 3664.463, S.E. = 358.834) than in the empirical block
(M = 2270.166, S.E. = 144.247).
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 mean reaction time of responses grouped by block. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
Fixation Analysis
To investigate looking behaviour between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted in which number of fixations was the dependent variable.
A main effect of block was obtained F(1,39) = 17.669, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.300. Pairwise
comparisons indicate a greater frequency of fixations in the preferential (M = 3.728, S.E. =
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0.265) block than in the empirical block (M = 2.415, S.E. = 0.265). There was no main effect of
choice. There was no block by choice interaction.
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Figure 4. Experiment 1 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.

Both blocks were found to be abnormally distributed with leftward skewed and
leptokurtic distributions. Preferential trials were more skewed and leptokurtic than empirical
trials indicating shorter overall response times and less variation in RTs across subjects.
The preferential block in Experiment 1 resulted in longer dwell time, slower RT and
greater number of fixations than those in the empirical block. The slower RT in the preferential
block than in the empirical block is congruent with the findings of Shimojo and colleagues’ 2003
findings. Recall that Shimojo and colleagues found that trials with similar attractiveness ratings
between face pairs resulted in slower RTs than those of face pairs that had differing
attractiveness ratings. Although the present task merely instructed participants to choose the
correct option out of a set of equal options in the preferential task, mean RTs remained consistent
across similar presentation of highly similar option pairs. Conversely, the empirical block (M =
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2270.166, S.E. = 144.247) maintained a mean RT that was consistently shorter than all RTs of
Shimojo and colleagues’ 2003 experiment. Extending the meaning of these three variables
following Glaholt and Reingold’s (2011) conceptualization of dwell time as selective encoding,
fixation number as comparison, along with reaction time as a measure of processing speed, the
preferential block resulted in longer primary selective encoding of options (DT), longer
processing time (RT), and more comparisons made between options (Fixation Count). It is
interesting to note that the differences in these three decision formation related variables did not
result in gaze bias but instead, gaze was evenly distributed between options.
Recall that Shimojo and colleagues (2003) experiment that first described the GBE
claimed that this effect both influences and reflects the process of preference formation. In this
experiment however, the absence of a gaze bias in both blocks suggests that subjectivity may not
be the fundamental contributing factor to this effect. The absence of the GBE in both blocks
might be due to the cognitive demands of this quite difficult task. To assess whether the GBE
would arise in a simpler task, we turn to Experiment 2.

Experiment 2
Dwell Time Analysis
To investigate possible gaze bias between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted in which proportional dwell time (as a percentage) was the dependent variable. A
main effect of block was obtained F (1, 39) = 10.026, p = .003, ƞ2 = 0.014. Longer dwell time
was shown in the preferential block (M = 0.440, S.E. = 0.006) than in the empirical block (M =
0.427, S.E. = 0.006).
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A main effect of choice was obtained F (1, 39) = 58.700, p < .001, ƞ2 = 0.363. Chosen items
resulted in a longer dwell time (MCHOSEN = 0.466, S.E. = 0.007) than unchosen (MUNCHOSEN =
0.401, S.E. = .007). There was no block by choice interaction.
Paired T-test analyses between choice in both blocks was conducted. Shapiro-Wilk tests of
normality revealed a normally distributed sample in the preferential block W (39) = .955, p =
0.116 but a significant deviation from normality in the empirical block W (39) = 0.790, p <
0.001. Therefore, Signed-Rank Wilcoxon tests were conducted. These tests revealed differences
between chosen and unchosen options in both preferential, t (39) = 3.717, p < 0.001, and
empirical, t (39) = 6.552, p < 0.001 blocks. The gaze bias was larger in the empirical block
(MCHOSEN = 0.467, S.E. = 0.012; MUNCHOSEN = 0.387, S.E. = 0.007) than in the preferential block
(MCHOSEN = 0.464, S.E. = 0.007; MUNCHOSEN = 0.416, S.E. = 0.010).
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 mean proportional dwell time of responses grouped by block and choice.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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RT Analysis
A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted and revealed that the sample was normally
distributed in preferential, W(340) = 0.974, p = .463 but not in empirical, W(40) = 0.936, p =
0.025 trials. Empirical trials had a skewness of 0.58 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of -0.73 (S.E.
0.73). Preferential trials had a skewness of 0.46 (S.E. = 0.37) and a kurtosis of 0.16 (S.E. 0.73).
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was conducted Z = 92.00, p < .001, which indicated that the RT
was longer in the preferential block (M = 3664.463, S.E. = 358.834) than in the empirical block
(M = 2270.166, S.E. = 144.247). The preferential block (M = 2367.873, S.E. = 123.418) was
shown to have a longer reaction time than the empirical block (M = 1901.402, S.E. = 104.645).
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 mean response time of responses grouped by block. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
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Fixation Analysis
To investigate looking behaviour between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted in which number of fixations was the dependent variable.
A main effect of block was obtained F(1,39) = 17.607, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.208. Pairwise
comparisons indicate a greater frequency of fixations in the preferential (M = 3.200, S.E. =
0.150) block than in the empirical block (M = 2.679, S.E. = 0.150). A main effect of choice was
obtained F(1,39) = 21.769, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.066. Pairwise comparisons indicate a greater
frequency of fixations towards chosen options (M = 3.086, S.E. = 0.140) than unchosen options
(M = 2.793, S.E. = 0.140). There was no block by choice interaction effect.
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Figure 7. Experiment 2 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.

Although preferential trials were normally distributed, the distribution was slightly
platykurtic and slightly skewed to the left. Empirical trials were abnormally distributed with a
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greater left skew and a platykurtic distribution plot, indicating shorter overall reactions times and
greater variation in RTs across subjects.
Similar to Experiment 1, mean dwell time differed by block, dwell times in the
preferential block were longer than those in the empirical block. In contrast, both blocks resulted
in a clear gaze bias towards chosen items. In addition, the empirical block resulted in a longer
gaze bias than that of the preferential block, which directly challenges the originating assumption
that gaze bias reflects preference formation. While the GBE may be related to preference
formation, it appears this effect may also have a role in objective, scored decision formation.
An interesting outcome of the two experiments was the revelation that the easier task
produced a larger GBE than the more difficult task. This finding is consistent with observations
that implicit eye effects such as pupil dilation vary as a function of task difficulty (van der Wel &
van Steenbergen, 2018). Additionally, an absence of the GBE in dislike tasks (Schotter, Berry,
McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010) was used to support the idea that gaze bias as a reflection of
preference formation but it might be the case that it was increased task difficulty instead.
Preference and dislike tasks are not only different in choice response, they may also differ in
difficulty level/cognitive load. For instance, one requires greater cognitive processing to decide
which item is liked and then to switch choices to the other item to complete a dislike task trial.
RT analysis of the two experiments were similar in that the preferential blocks had longer
RTs than empirical blocks in both. Fixation analyses was also similar in that preferential blocks
showed greater mean number of fixations. However, these differences require direct statistical
analysis across studies 1 and 2.
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Experiments 1 & 2 Analysis
Dwell Time Analysis
To compare mean dwell times between studies 1 and 2, a 2X2X2 repeated-measures
ANOVA by experiment (2 factors: 1, 2), block (2 factors: empirical, preferential) and choice (2
factors: chosen, unchosen) of proportional dwell time was conducted. A main effect of
experiment was obtained, F(1,39) = 6.006, p = 0.019, ƞ2 = 0.029. Pairwise comparisons revealed
longer dwell times in Experiment 2 (M = 0.434, S.E. = 0.005) than Experiment 1 (M = 0.416,
S.E. = 0.005). A main effect of block was obtained, F(1,39) = 15.512, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.013.
Pairwise comparisons indicate longer mean dwell time in the preferential blocks (M = 0.431, S.E.
= 0.004) than empirical blocks (M = 0.419, S.E. = 0.004). A main effect of choice was obtained,
F(1,39) = 41.698, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.125 with chosen being longer than unchosen (M = 0.443, S.E.
= 0.007) than unchosen options (M = 0.406, S.E. = 0.007).
An interaction between experiment and choice was obtained, F(1,39) = 23.291, p <
0.001, ƞ2 = 0.071. Simple main effects revealed that experiment had an effect on the mean dwell
time of chosen options, F(1,39) = 24.575, p < 0.001, but no effect on mean dwell time of
unchosen options. Pairwise comparisons between chosen items in each experiment revealed
Experiment 2 had longer mean dwell times of chosen options (MCHOSEN = 0.466, S.E. = 0.007)
than those of Experiment 1 (MCHOSEN = 0.420, S.E. = 0.007).
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Figure 11. Experiments 1 & 2 mean proportional dwell time of responses grouped by block and
choice. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
RT Analysis
To compare mean reaction time (in milliseconds) between studies, a 2X2 repeatedmeasures ANOVA by experiment (2 factors: 1,2) and block (2 factors: empirical, preferential)
was conducted. A main effect of experiment was obtained, F(1,39) = 10.180, p = 0.003, ƞ2 =
0.106. Pairwise comparisons indicate longer mean RTs in Experiment 1 (M = 2967.314, S.E. =
174.834) than in Experiment 2 (M = 2134.637, S.E. = 174.834).
A main effect of block was obtained, F(1,39) = 28.350, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.133. Pairwise
comparisons indicate that the preferential block showed nearly 1000 ms longer mean RT (M =
3016.168, S.E. = 145.508) than those in the empirical block (M = 2085.784, S.E. = 145.508).
An interaction effect between experiment and block was obtained, F(1,39) = 9.277, p = 0.004, ƞ2
= 0.033. Simple main effects analysis revealed preferential block RT differed between
Experiment 1 (M = 3664.643, S.E. = 209.614) and Experiment 2 (M = 2367.873, S.E. =
209.614), F(1,39) = 11.605, p = 0.002, and no difference between empirical block RTs.
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Figure 12. Experiments 1 & 2 mean response time of responses grouped by block. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.

Fixation Analysis
To compare looking behaviour between experiments, a 2X2X2 repeated-measures
ANOVA by experiment (2 factors: Experiment 1, Experiment 2), block (2 factors: Empirical,
Preferential), and choice (2 factors: Chosen, Unchosen) was conducted using mean number of
fixations as the dependent variable. A main effect of block was found F(1,39) = 27.344, p <
0.001, ƞ2 = 0.131. Pairwise comparisons indicate that the preferential blocks (M = 3.464, S.E. =
0.147) resulted in a greater mean number of fixations than in the empirical blocks (M = 2.547,
S.E. = 0.147). A main effect of choice was obtained, F(1,39) = 15.971, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.005.
Pairwise comparisons indicate that there was a greater mean number of fixations towards the
chosen options (M = 3.090, S.E. = 0.120) than the unchosen options (M = 2.920, S.E. = 0.120).
Although there was no main effect of experiment, an experiment by block interaction was
obtained F(1,39) = 6.099, p = 0.018, ƞ2 = 0.025. Simple main effects analysis indicated that
Experiment 1 had an effect on blocks, F(1,39) = 17.669, p < 0.001. Preferential block resulted in
more fixations (M = 3.728, S.E. = 0.216) than empirical blocks (M = 2.415, S.E. = 0.216).
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Experiment 2 also had an effect on blocks, F(1,39) = 17.607, p < 0.001. Again, preferential
blocks resulted in more fixations (M = 3.200, S.E. = 0.216) than empirical blocks (M = 2.679,
S.E. = 0.216).
Additionally, an experiment by choice interaction effect was obtained, F(1,39) = 12.088,
p = 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.002. Simple main effects analysis indicated that Experiment 2 had an effect on
choice F(1,39) = 21.769, p < 0.001, and Experiment 1 had no effect on choice. Chosen options
resulted in more fixations (M = 3.086, S.E. = 0.182) than unchosen options (M = 2.793, S.E. =
0.182) in Experiment 2.
4
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Figure 13. Experiments 1 & 2 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error
bars represent standard error of the mean.
The preceding analysis compared the results of two experiments to determine
whether task demands could explain differences in GBE in the two experiments. Although
such comparisons would typically be done within a single experiment, the analysis is not
without merit. Importantly the participants for both experiments were drawn from the
same population and the two experiments were run in a very similar fashion with only task
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differences. Nonetheless a caveat preceding this discussion is warranted – this betweenexperiment comparison is a weakness in the design that arose; it was only after data from
both studies were analyzed that the differences between the two and the possible
explanation was revealed.
Experiment 2 resulted in longer overall dwell time (42%) than Experiment 1 (41%). By
block, preferential trials had longer DT (43%) than empirical trials (41%), and by choice, the
chosen items resulted in a longer DT (44%) than the unchosen options (40%). The Experiment
by Choice interaction reveals that Experiment 2 had longer allocated gaze towards chosen
options, and that unchosen options were not affected by experiment. Mean DT of chosen options
in Experiment 2 were longer (46%) than in Experiment 1 (42%). These results, taken together
with previous results that revealed a strong gaze bias in Experiment 2 and an absence of this
effect in Experiment 1, suggest that gaze towards the chosen option determines the presence of a
gaze bias. In other words, unchosen items were not affected by this interaction effect and
therefore participant gaze towards unchosen items was not decreased, rather their gaze towards
the chosen items was increased.
With a difference of 833ms RTs for Experiment 1 (2,967ms) results were substantially
longer than those of Experiment 2 (2,134ms). By block, there was a 931ms processing speed
disadvantage for preferential trials (3,016ms) as compared to empirical trials (2,085ms). When
considered with the accuracy data this indicates that Experiment 1 was more difficult than
Experiment 2. This indicates that rather than a strategy-shift (that would have shown up as a
speed-accuracy tradeoff) the RT in the preferential trials were affected by experiment, but
empirical trials were not.
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Finally, the analysis of number of fixations indicated that there was no difference across
studies, but there was a difference across blocks and across choice options. An increased number
of fixations in the preferential block is congruent with co-occurring longer RTs, and an increased
number of fixations in chosen options than unchosen is congruent with the longer overall
proportion of dwell time in chosen items.
Experiment 3
Dwell Time Analysis
To investigate possible gaze bias between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted in which proportional dwell time (as a percentage) was the dependent variable. A
main effect of block was obtained F(1,38) = 4.276, p = .046, ƞ2 = 0.026 in which the gender
biased block resulted in a longer proportion of dwell time (M = 0.435, S.E. = 0.007) than the
neutral block (M = 0.424, S.E. = 0.007).
The gendered block resulted in equal dwell times of chosen (M = 0.431, S.E. = 0.008) and
unchosen (M = 0.439, S.E. = 0.008) options and the neutral block resulted in the same (MCHOSEN
= 0.426, S.E. = 0.008; MUNCHOSEN = 0.422, S.E. = 0.008), there was no main effect of choice.
There was no block by choice interaction effect.
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Figure 8. Experiment 3 mean proportional dwell time of responses grouped by block and choice.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

RT Analysis
A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted, concluding that the dataset is not normally
distributed in both biased, W(39) = 0.856, p < 0.001, and neutral, W(39) = 0.738, p < 0.001 .
Biased trials had a skew of 1.85 (S.E. = 0.38) and a kurtosis of 5.21 (S.E. 0.74). Neutral trials
had a skewness of 2.9 (S.E. = 0.38) and a kurtosis of 13.2 (S.E. 0.74). A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
test was conducted Z = 410.00, p < .788, which indicated that there was no difference in RT
between the gender biased block (M = 2505.775, S.E. = 182.064) and the gender-neutral block
(M = 2439.531, S.E. = 206.683).
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Figure 9. Experiment 3 mean response time of responses grouped by block. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.

Fixation Analysis
To investigate looking behaviour between blocks, a block (2 factors: empirical and
preferential) by choice (2 factors: chosen and unchosen) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted in which number of fixations was the dependent variable. There was no main effect of
block between gender biased trials (M = 3.470, S.E. = 0.210) and neutral trials (M = 3.282, S.E. =
0.210). There was no main effect of choice. There was no interaction effect between block and
choice.
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Figure 10. Experiment 3 mean fixation count of options grouped by block and choice. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.

Both blocks were skewed to the left and strongly leptokurtic in distribution, neutral trials
were much more leptokurtic and skewed to the left than biased trials. This indicates that RTs
tended to be shorter in the overall distributions with low variance across participants.
The gender biased block resulted in longer proportional dwell time than the genderneutral block. There was no difference in dwell time between chosen and unchosen options.
Mean RT and mean number of fixations were equal in both blocks. Taken together, the results
suggest that eye-movement behaviour only differs slightly when two gender-opposite word pairs
were presented in terms of selective encoding (mean dwell time proportion), but how these
word-pairs were compared (mean number of looks) and the speed at which word pairs were
processed and chosen (mean RT in milliseconds) did not differ. There was no effect of gaze bias
towards any chosen option in either block. It is worth noting that a possible explanation for the
unique difference between blocks in dwell time, despite equal results of choice gaze, RT, and
fixation number, could be that participants allocated comparably more eye-movement towards
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the white space on the computer screen in the neutral block than the gender-bias block during the
selective encoding process. In other words, encoding two gender opposing traits/roles may
require longer scanning, or elicit greater attention capture than encoding two neutral trait/roles
word pairs. In contrast, comparing and choosing between gender-biased and gender-neutral
words are not distinct in the decision process.

General Discussion
The gaze bias effect has emerged from preferential decision-making of faces (Shimojo,
Simion, Shimojo & Scheier, 2003) and has been tested from option sets of 2 to 8 (Glaholt &
Reingold, 2009a), dislike tasks (Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010; Shimojo et al.,
2003), judgements of products/brightness of images (Onuma, Penwannakul, Fuchimoto, &
Sakai, 2017), image recency/landscape images (Schotter, Berry, McKenzie, & Rayner, 2010) and
novel subject matter (i.e. Fourier Transform) (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo & Scheier, 2003).
However, testing of the gaze bias effect in scored, rule-based decision processes had yet to be
examined. Additionally, the presence of this effect in stimuli such as weighted features,
mathematical and linguistic combinations was unknown.
The major objective of this project was to describe the behavioural differences between
preferential and empirical decision making. To do this, both decision types were completed by
each participant, in which selective encoding, comparison stage, gaze bias, and processing speed
were contrasted between blocks. In extending the analysis, separate stimulus sets were used to
consider variations of decision making across feature, number and linguistic comparisons.
The first metric of interest was gaze bias effect and whether it could be replicated in a
non-preference task that involves the goal of choosing an objectively correct option in a scored
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task. Evidence of the GBE would challenge Shimojo and colleagues (2003) gaze cascade
hypothesis which relied heavily on the concepts of preferential looking compounding over time
and resulting in a disproportionate amount of time spent looking at the chosen item. In
Experiment 2, when participants chose between two math sum option sets, the gaze bias is not
only present in both empirical and preferential blocks, but the GBE is strongest in the empirical
block. In other words, when participants were comparing a correct option and an incorrect
option, they gazed longer at the chosen option than when they were comparing two equal
options. This supports the counter argument that the GBE can be independent of preference since
the task goal of accuracy guided the visual decision-making process. Further, the complete
absence of the effect in Experiment 1 in which decision is guided by colour, line and shape
“inequalities” suggests that certain features of visual decision making interfere with eye
movement during decision. Extending this finding further to Experiment 3, there was an absence
of the gaze bias effect as well when decisions were made between words. Subject-matter may
therefore dictate the extent to which a gaze bias effect exists (e.g., visual versus verbal stimuli).
Secondly, the dwell or fixation number analyses measured how options were being
compared. A greater degree of comparison occurred in preferential blocks overall, which is
expected since there is a “cue” (correct option) present in the empirical block but absent in the
preferential block that would terminate the comparison stage. When including choice as a
variable, there was a greater number of fixations allocated towards the chosen options than the
unchosen options overall, and this effect was greatest in Experiment 2. This is congruent with the
previous finding of a gaze bias effect in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1. When
considering Shimojo & colleagues’ (2003) positive feedback loop, it is worth noting that a larger
comparison stage of decision appears to occur in the preferential block, which could contribute
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to a “loop” of comparing options and choosing the most frequently looked at item. However, the
lack of a gaze bias effect (in terms of gaze duration) in Experiment 1 conflicts with this possible
explanation. It is important to recall that Shimojo & colleagues’ (2003) gaze bias effect was
modeled as a probabilistic effect of there being an exponentially increasing chance of gaze
towards the chosen item. Since this model involves both gaze duration and number of fixations,
future research of the gaze bias effect should measure both variables separately when testing
whether the effect is present. Experiment 1 shows a lack of gaze bias at both levels (gaze
duration, number of fixations) and Experiment 2 shows the presence of the effect at both levels.
Recall that reaction time from stimulus onset to response action is defined as the speed of
processing over an entire trial. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the preferential block resulted in
longer processing speeds than empirical block trials, a difference of over 1 second (1394ms) in
Experiment 1 and just under half a second (466ms) in Experiment 2. Such a large disparity
between the two studies may have been due to the greater difficulty in the first experiment than
in the second experiment, and this is reflected by the accuracy scores. Regardless, the shorter
processing speeds in the empirical blocks suggest that it takes less time to process a response
between a correct/incorrect option pair than an equal option pair.
Finally, Experiment 3 was meant to test whether a linguistic decision task would mirror
the results of either Experiment 1 or 2, and if the behaviour in choosing between genderstereotypical and non-stereotypical words would be similar to the preferential/empirical blocks.
Interestingly, only the selective encoding stage was different between blocks, in which the
gender-biased block (43.5%) resulted in longer dwell times than the neutral block (42.5%).
These values were most similar to Experiment 2’s preferential block (44.0%) and empirical
block (42.7%). However, this was the only similarity found. There was no gaze bias effect

47

towards any option, processing speed was equal (between 2489-2505ms) and the mean number
of fixations was just over 3 in each block. These results indicate that gender-stereotyped words
are selectively encoded for a longer duration then gender-neutral words, but both options are
looked at equally, each option set is compared in the same way, and the time is takes to process
and choose an item is equal. The results of this study may reflect limitations of studying
language from a decision-making perspective. Perhaps the contextual differences of Experiment
3, such as including a sentence prime and both blocks differing by gender rather than
empirical/preferential differences, led to similar comparisons and responses. The finding that
masculine-feminine word pairs had longer overall dwell times than neutral-neutral word pairs
suggests that gendered words may carry more “meaning” which require longer encoding than
neutral traits/roles, all other variables being equal. More research needs to be done on the
sentence prime task to observe a possible difference in visual decision strategy between types of
words. For example, words that are opposites on emotional-valence scales may result in different
eye-movement/choice results than emotionally neutral words.
To summarize, this study examined multiple factors of visual decision including gaze
bias, selective encoding, comparison, processing speed and response in an effort to characterize
decision behaviours as implicit strategies. Although more work is required to fully support the
development of a full model of decision making and gaze bias across domains this study
highlights the promise of cross modal investigations. This study serves as an example of how
complex and multifactored visual decision-making can be investigated to provide data to inform
such a model.
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Appendix A
Experiment 1 Trial Examples

Figure 1. Trial example of Experiment 1 Feature Inequality Task. Pre-trial rules precede subject
button press and 500ms fixation cross and 2-AFC trial screen. Unambiguous block
represents empirical block with correct (green circle) and incorrect (horizontal-lined
triangle) option pair. Ambiguous block represents 2 equal option pair relative to one
another.
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Appendix B
Experiment 2 Trial Examples

Figure 2. Trial example of Experiment 2 Math Inequality Task. 500ms fixation cross precedes 2AFC trial screen. Unambiguous block represents empirical block with correct (2+6) and
incorrect (3+4) option pair. Ambiguous block represents 2 equal option pair relative to
one another.

57

Appendix C
Experiment 3 Trial Examples

Figure 3. Trial example of Experiment 3 Trait/Role Stereotype Task. Gendered sentence stem
precedes 500ms fixation cross and 2-AFC trial screen. Unambiguous block represents
empirical block with masculine (mechanic) and feminine (Nurse) option pair. Ambiguous
block represents 2 gender-neutral option pair.
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Appendix D
Data Analysis Outputs
Experiment 1 Dwell Time

Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Block

0.005

1

0.005

Residuals

0.035

39

9.079e -4

Choice

0.003

1

0.003

Residuals

0.094

39

0.002

Block ✻ Choice

5.583e -6

1

5.583e -6

Residuals

0.082

39

0.002

F

p

5.413 0.025

0.022

1.325 0.257

0.015

0.003 0.959 2.550e -5

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Block
Empirical

Choice Mean SD

N

Chosen 0.415 0.039 40
Unchosen 0.406 0.039 40

Preferential Chosen 0.426 0.045 40
Unchosen 0.417 0.057 40

Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

0.410

0.401

0.420

0.005

Preferential

0.421

0.412

0.431

0.005

Experiment 1 RT

η²
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Paired Samples T-Test
Measure 1
Exp

Measure 2
-

Pref

Test

Statistic

df

p

Effect Size

Student

-4.427

39

< .001

-0.700

Wilcoxon

104.000

< .001

-0.746

Note. For the Student t-test, effect size is given by Cohen's d. For the Wilcoxon test, effect size is given
by the matched rank biserial correlation.

Assumption Checks
Descriptive Statistics
Exp
Pref
Valid
40
40
Missing
0
0
Mean
2270.166 3664.463
Std. Deviation
912.301 2269.466
Skewness
1.130
2.016
Std. Error of Skewness
0.374
0.374
Kurtosis
0.843
4.331
Std. Error of Kurtosis
0.733
0.733
Shapiro-Wilk
0.899
0.783
P-value of Shapiro-Wilk
0.002
< .001
Minimum
1000.249 1369.110
Maximum
4704.349 11749.972

Descriptives
N

Mean

SD

SE

Exp 40

2270.166

912.301

144.247

Pref 40

3664.463

2269.466

358.834

Experiment 1 Number of Fixations
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Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Block

68.948

1

68.948

Residuals

152.184

39

3.902

Choice

0.085

1

0.085

Residuals

3.417

39

0.088

Block ✻ Choice

0.096

1

0.096

Residuals

4.828

39

0.124

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Block
Empirical

Choice Mean SD
Chosen

N

2.462 0.848 40

Unchosen 2.367 0.798 40
Preferential Chosen

3.726 2.195 40

Unchosen 3.729 2.303 40

F

p

17.669 < .001

η²
0.300

0.965 0.332 3.684e -4

0.774 0.384 4.172e -4
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Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

2.415

1.886

2.944 0.265

Preferential

3.728

3.199

4.257 0.265

Experiment 2 Dwell Time

Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Block

0.006

1

0.006

Residuals

0.024

39

6.226e -4

Choice

0.166

1

0.166

Residuals

0.110

39

0.003

Block ✻ Choice

0.010

1

0.010

Residuals

0.140

39

0.004

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Block
Empirical

Choice Mean SD

N

Chosen 0.467 0.075 40

F

p

η²

10.026 0.003 0.014

58.700 < .001 0.363

2.804 0.102 0.022
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Descriptives
Block

Choice Mean SD

N

Unchosen 0.387 0.043 40
Preferential Chosen 0.464 0.045 40
Unchosen 0.416 0.060 40

Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

0.427

0.414

0.440

0.006

Preferential

0.440

0.427

0.453

0.006

Marginal Means - Choice
95% CI for Mean Difference
Choice Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Chosen

0.466

0.451

0.481

0.007

Unchosen

0.401

0.386

0.416

0.007

Experiment 2 RT
Paired Samples T-Test
Measure 1

Measure 2

Test

Statistic df

p

Empirical - Preferential Student -5.287 39 < .001
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Paired Samples T-Test
Measure 1

Measure 2

Test

Statistic df

Wilcoxon 92.000

p
< .001

Assumption Checks
Descriptive Statistics
Experiential Preferential
Valid

40

40

0

0

1901.402

2367.873

661.836

780.564

Skewness

0.581

0.464

Std. Error of Skewness

0.374

0.374

-0.725

0.161

Std. Error of Kurtosis

0.733

0.733

Shapiro-Wilk

0.936

0.974

P-value of Shapiro-Wilk

0.025

0.463

Minimum

917.921

959.981

Maximum

3373.173

4570.373

Missing
Mean
Std. Deviation

Kurtosis
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Descriptives
N

Mean

SD

SE

Empirical 40 1901.402 661.836 104.645
Preferential 40 2367.873 780.564 123.418

Experiment 2 Number of Fixations

Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Block

10.837

1

10.837

Residuals

24.004

39

0.615

Choice

3.454

1

3.454

Residuals

6.188

39

0.159

Block ✻ Choice

0.007

1

0.007

Residuals

7.692

39

0.197

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Block
Empirical

Choice Mean SD

N

Chosen 2.833 0.975 40
Unchosen 2.526 0.832 40

Preferential Chosen 3.340 1.112 40

F

p

η²

17.607 < .001

0.208

21.769 < .001

0.066

0.036 0.849 1.379e -4
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Descriptives
Block

Choice Mean SD

N

Unchosen 3.060 1.037 40

Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

2.679

2.379

2.980

0.150

Preferential

3.200

2.899

3.500

0.150

Marginal Means - Choice
95% CI for Mean Difference
Choice Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Chosen

3.086

2.804

3.369

0.140

Unchosen

2.793

2.510

3.075

0.140

Experiment 3 Dwell Time

Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases
Block

Sum of Squares df Mean Square
0.005 1

F

p

0.005 4.276 0.046

η²
0.026

66
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

F

p

Residuals

0.043 38

Choice

1.831e -4 1

Residuals

0.086 38

0.002

Block ✻ Choice

0.002 1

0.002 1.373 0.249

Residuals

0.049 38

0.001

0.001
1.831e -4 0.081 0.778 9.891e -4

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Block

Choice Mean SD

N

Gendered Chosen 0.431 0.043 39
Unchosen 0.439 0.041 39
Neutral

η²

Chosen 0.426 0.052 39
Unchosen 0.422 0.068 39

Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Gendered

0.435

0.421

0.449

0.007

Neutral

0.424

0.410

0.438

0.007

0.010

67

Experiment 3 RT
Paired Samples T-Test
Measure 1 Measure 2
Bias

- Neutral

Test

Statistic df

Student

p

0.190 38 0.851

Wilcoxon 410.000

0.788

Assumption Checks
Descriptive Statistics
Bias Neutral
Valid
39
39
Missing
0
0
Mean
2505.775 2489.531
Std. Deviation
1136.990 1290.733
Skewness
1.850
2.989
Std. Error of Skewness
0.378
0.378
Kurtosis
5.206 13.201
Std. Error of Kurtosis
0.741
0.741
Shapiro-Wilk
0.856
0.738
P-value of Shapiro-Wilk < .001 < .001
Minimum
1037.682 1130.940
Maximum
6888.737 8649.503

Descriptives
N
Bias

Mean

SD

SE

39 2505.775 1136.990 182.064

Neutral 39 2489.531 1290.733 206.683

Experiment 3 Number of Fixations
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Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Block

1.378

1

1.378

Residuals

14.826

38

0.390

Choice

0.001

1

0.001

Residuals

5.645

38

0.149

Block ✻ Choice

0.001

1

0.001

Residuals

3.684

38

0.097

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Block

Choice Mean SD

N

Biased

Chosen 3.470 1.271 39
Unchosen 3.470 1.445 39

Neutral Chosen 3.276 1.283 39
Unchosen 3.289 1.329 39

Experiments 1 & 2 Dwell Time

F

p

3.532 0.068

η²
0.054

0.010 0.921 5.765e -5

0.015 0.902 5.782e -5
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Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Experiment

0.025

1

0.025

Residuals

0.163

39

0.004

Block

0.011

1

0.011

Residuals

0.028

39

7.166e -4

Choice

0.108

1

0.108

Residuals

0.101

39

0.003

Experiment ✻ Block

3.961e -5

1

3.961e -5

Residuals

0.032

39

8.138e -4

Experiment ✻ Choice

0.062

1

0.062

Residuals

0.103

39

0.003

Block ✻ Choice

0.005

1

0.005

Residuals

0.108

39

0.003

Experiment ✻ Block ✻ Choice

0.005

1

0.005

Residuals

0.114

39

0.003

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Experiment
1

Block
Empirical

Choice Mean SD

N

Chosen 0.415 0.039 40

F

p

η²

6.006 0.019

0.029

15.512 < .001

0.013

41.698 < .001

0.125

0.049 0.827 4.587e -5

23.291 < .001

0.071

1.911 0.175

0.006

1.638 0.208

0.006
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Descriptives
Experiment

Block

Choice Mean SD

N

Unchosen 0.406 0.039 40
Preferential Chosen 0.426 0.045 40
Unchosen 0.417 0.057 40
2

Empirical

Chosen 0.467 0.075 40
Unchosen 0.387 0.043 40

Preferential Chosen 0.464 0.045 40
Unchosen 0.416 0.060 40

Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Experiment
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

X1

0.416

0.405

0.426

0.005

X2

0.434

0.423

0.444

0.005

Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

0.419

0.410

0.427

0.004

Preferential

0.431

0.422

0.439

0.004
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Marginal Means - Choice
95% CI for Mean Difference
Choice Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Chosen

0.443

0.433

0.453

0.005

Unchosen

0.406

0.397

0.416

0.005

Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Choice
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment Choice Marginal Mean
X1

Chosen

X2
X1

Unchosen

X2

Lower

Upper

SE

0.420

0.407

0.433

0.007

0.466

0.453

0.479

0.007

0.411

0.398

0.425

0.007

0.401

0.388

0.415

0.007

Simple Main Effects
Simple Main Effects - Experiment
Level of Choice Sum of Squares df Mean Square

F

p

Chosen

0.083

1

0.083

24.575 < .001

Unchosen

0.004

1

0.004

1.176 0.285

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Experiments 1 & 2 RT
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Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Experiment

2.773e +7

1

2.773e +7

Residuals

1.063e +8

39

2.724e +6

Block

3.462e +7

1

3.462e +7

Residuals

4.763e +7

39

1.221e +6

Experiment ✻ Block

8.609e +6

1

8.609e +6

Residuals

3.580e +7

39 918035.941

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Experiment
1

Block

Mean

SD

N

Empirical 2270.166 912.301 40
Preferential 3664.463 2269.466 40

2

Empirical 1901.402 661.836 40
Preferential 2367.873 780.564 40

F

p

η²

10.180 0.003 0.106

28.350 < .001 0.133

9.377 0.004 0.033
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Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Experiment
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

X1

2967.314

2619.174

3315.454

174.834

X2

2134.637

1786.497

2482.777

174.834

Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

2085.784

1795.744

2375.824

145.508

Preferential

3016.168

2726.128

3306.208

145.508

Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment
X1

Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

2270.166

1855.569

2684.763

209.614

1901.402

1486.805

2315.999

209.614

3664.463

3249.866

4079.060

209.614

2367.873

1953.276

2782.470

209.614

X2
X1
X2

Preferential
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Simple Main Effects
Simple Main Effects - Experiment
Level of Block Sum of Squares df Mean Square

F

p

Empirical

2.720e +6

1

2.720e +6

3.638 0.064

Preferential

3.362e +7

1

3.362e +7

11.615 0.002

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Experiments 1 & 2 Number of Fixations

Repeated Measures ANOVA
Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Experiment

1.386

1

1.386

Residuals

228.855

39

5.868

Block

67.227

1

67.227

Residuals

95.882

39

2.459

Choice

2.310

1

2.310

Residuals

5.640

39

0.145

Experiment ✻ Block

12.558

1

12.558

Residuals

80.306

39

2.059

Experiment ✻ Choice

1.229

1

1.229

Residuals

3.965

39

0.102

Block ✻ Choice

0.078

1

0.078

Residuals

7.418

39

0.190

F

p

η²

0.236 0.630

0.003

27.344 < .001

0.131

15.971 < .001

0.005

6.099 0.018

0.025

12.088 0.001

0.002

0.409 0.526 1.519e -4
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Within Participants Effects
Cases

Sum of Squares df Mean Square

Experiment ✻ Block ✻ Choice

0.025

1

0.025

Residuals

5.101

39

0.131

Note. Type III Sum of Squares

Descriptives
Experiment
1

Block
Empirical

Choice Mean SD

N

Chosen 2.462 0.848 40
Unchosen 2.367 0.798 40

Preferential Chosen 3.726 2.195 40
Unchosen 3.729 2.303 40
2

Empirical

Chosen 2.833 0.975 40
Unchosen 2.526 0.832 40

Preferential Chosen 3.340 1.112 40
Unchosen 3.060 1.037 40

Marginal Means
Marginal Means - Experiment
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment Marginal Mean
X1

3.071

Lower

Upper

SE

2.713

3.429

0.180

F

p

η²

0.193 0.663 4.929e -5
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Marginal Means - Experiment
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment Marginal Mean
X2

2.940

Lower

Upper

SE

2.581

3.298

0.180

Marginal Means - Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

2.547

2.253

2.840

0.147

Preferential

3.464

3.170

3.757

0.147

Marginal Means - Choice
95% CI for Mean Difference
Choice Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Chosen

3.090

2.848

3.333

0.120

Unchosen

2.920

2.678

3.163

0.120

Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment
X1
X2

Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Empirical

2.415

1.988

2.841

0.216

2.679

2.253

3.106

0.216
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Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Block
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment
X1

Block

Marginal Mean

Lower

Upper

SE

Preferential

3.728

3.301

4.154

0.216

3.200

2.773

3.626

0.216

X2

Marginal Means - Experiment ✻ Choice
95% CI for Mean Difference
Experiment Choice Marginal Mean
X1

Chosen

X2
X1

Unchosen

X2

Lower

Upper

SE

3.094

2.732

3.456

0.182

3.086

2.724

3.449

0.182

3.048

2.686

3.410

0.182

2.793

2.431

3.155

0.182

Simple Main Effects
Simple Main Effects - Choice
Level of Experiment Sum of Squares df Mean Square

F

p

1

0.085

1

0.085

0.965 0.332

2

3.454

1

3.454

21.769 < .001

Note. Type III Sum of Squares
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